Add to ORKGA number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics. I solve for the optimal mechanism. The choice between market or non-market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay
In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed ...
Often an organization, government or entity must allocate goods without collecting payment in return...
We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The agent’s value e...
A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear...
Both market (e.g. auctions) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. lotteries and prior-ity lists) are used ...
In this paper I study the allocation of scarce and indivisible goods (or burdens) in cases where mon...
In chapter one I study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical indivisible objects ...
Discussion paperOften an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment i...
Author's draft dated February 2010 issued as discussion paper by University of Exeter Business Schoo...
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This m...
We consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers. There...
Abstract: This paper studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Sch...
This paper studies welfare maximizing allocation of indivisible objects to ex-ante identical agents ...
This article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Schemes tha...
In this thesis, I study mechanism design problems in environments where the information necessary to...
In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed ...
Often an organization, government or entity must allocate goods without collecting payment in return...
We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The agent’s value e...
A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear...
Both market (e.g. auctions) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. lotteries and prior-ity lists) are used ...
In this paper I study the allocation of scarce and indivisible goods (or burdens) in cases where mon...
In chapter one I study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical indivisible objects ...
Discussion paperOften an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment i...
Author's draft dated February 2010 issued as discussion paper by University of Exeter Business Schoo...
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This m...
We consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers. There...
Abstract: This paper studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Sch...
This paper studies welfare maximizing allocation of indivisible objects to ex-ante identical agents ...
This article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Schemes tha...
In this thesis, I study mechanism design problems in environments where the information necessary to...
In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed ...
Often an organization, government or entity must allocate goods without collecting payment in return...
We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The agent’s value e...