Add to ORKGAbstract. We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as well as the actions of the other. Our main finding is that increased interaction between the agents can lower the speed of learning: when both agents observe each other, learning is significantly slower than it is when one only observes the other. This slowdown is driven by a process in which a consensus on the wrong action causes the agents to discount new contrary evidence
This paper reports an experimental test of how, when observing others' actions, participants learn m...
In an experiment, players? ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner?s dilemma was subs...
We study observational learning in environments with congestion costs: an agent's payoff from choosi...
Abstract. We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as we...
We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as well as the ...
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each ot...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their...
We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions...
e study the rate of convergence of Bayesian learning in social networks. Each individual receives a ...
When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors...
This paper analyzes the problem of matching heterogenous agents in a Bayesian learning model. One ag...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
This paper uses a continuous-time war of attrition model to investigatethow learning about private p...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
This paper reports an experimental test of how, when observing others' actions, participants learn m...
In an experiment, players? ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner?s dilemma was subs...
We study observational learning in environments with congestion costs: an agent's payoff from choosi...
Abstract. We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as we...
We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as well as the ...
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each ot...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their...
We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions...
e study the rate of convergence of Bayesian learning in social networks. Each individual receives a ...
When individuals in a social network learn about an unknown state from private signals and neighbors...
This paper analyzes the problem of matching heterogenous agents in a Bayesian learning model. One ag...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
This paper uses a continuous-time war of attrition model to investigatethow learning about private p...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
This paper reports an experimental test of how, when observing others' actions, participants learn m...
In an experiment, players? ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner?s dilemma was subs...
We study observational learning in environments with congestion costs: an agent's payoff from choosi...