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This paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs, i.e.. those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased, to the case of a symmetric oligopoly. Competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a Cournot framework. Various equilibria are obtained, which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors ‘ strategies. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff. The phenomena of buyer self-selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in Cournot models both appear in the results. Journal of Economic Literature Classitication Numbers: 022, 611. Nonlinear prices, i.e., those with marginal rates varying with the quantity purchased, are commonly found in many markets. Quantity discounts are available in purchasing most types of durable goods. Products or services with metered usage, such as rental cars, photocopiers, long distance telephone calls, and digital communications are typically offered with a variety of price plans, depending on the quantity consumed. Recently nonlinear pricing has received considerable attention in the economic literature. Nonlinear tariffs charged by a monopoly supplier have been studied by M. Spence [lo]; Stiglitz [ 111; Goldman, Leland an