Add to ORKGConsider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly informa-tion about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. Information gathering is covert. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficient implementation and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational. JEL Classification: D44, D8
We study a mechanism design model with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a princ...
Summary. We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used ...
We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an...
Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, pay...
nio Stacchetti, an anonymous referee, and an associate editor for insightful and extremely helpful c...
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information bef...
The optimal mechanism literature shows that the principal can extract all the equilibrium payoffs at...
Agents who have private information may misrepresent it, to manipulate a system of rules in their fa...
In models of asymmetric information, possession of private information leads to rents for the posses...
In a landmark paper in the mechanism design literature, Cremer and McLean (1985) (CM for short) show...
There are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is ...
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals and interdepende...
Our goal is to describe the state of the art on Bayesian mechanisms when utility is transferable and...
Recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private information a...
It is well known that when agents' types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the enti...
We study a mechanism design model with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a princ...
Summary. We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used ...
We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an...
Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, pay...
nio Stacchetti, an anonymous referee, and an associate editor for insightful and extremely helpful c...
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information bef...
The optimal mechanism literature shows that the principal can extract all the equilibrium payoffs at...
Agents who have private information may misrepresent it, to manipulate a system of rules in their fa...
In models of asymmetric information, possession of private information leads to rents for the posses...
In a landmark paper in the mechanism design literature, Cremer and McLean (1985) (CM for short) show...
There are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is ...
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals and interdepende...
Our goal is to describe the state of the art on Bayesian mechanisms when utility is transferable and...
Recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private information a...
It is well known that when agents' types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the enti...
We study a mechanism design model with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a princ...
Summary. We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used ...
We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an...