Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions

In multi-level political systems politicians have several possible career paths, as they can advance their careers at the lower (state) or higher (federal) level. We argue that the design of the electoral institutions influences how politicians respond to these incentives. Analyzing a unique dataset of both ‘stated ’ and ‘realized ’ career ambitions of Members of the European Parliament we find that those who seek to move from the European to the national level participate less in legislative activities than those who plan to stay at the European level. Furthermore, legislators who want to continue in the European Parliament participate more if they originate from party-centered than candidate-centered electoral systems. Finally, fir MEPs who aim to move to the national level, participation is substantively lower amongst legislators from candidate-centered systems. These findings suggest that the responsiveness associated with candidate-centered systems comes at the expense of legislative activity, at least in low-salience legislatures