Co-Evolution of Cooperative Strategies under Egoism

This paper examines which elements are necessary for coevo-lutionary genetic algorithms to evolve cooperative strategies under pure egoistic considerations. Since competitions and cooperations coexist in an auction-based manpower alloca-tion problem, the problem is adopted for further investi-gation. To alleviate analytical burden, the problem is ab-stracted to a resource-bidding game under the Nash game framework. A mathematical model for the resource-bidding game is defined and several special cases are illustrated. One of these special cases, named c-mNE, is further investigated due to the existance of cooperative modes. Various kinds of egoistic fitness functions and evolutionary mechanisms are experimented on c-mNE. Based on the experimental results, this paper suggests that coevolutionary mechanisms which Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Copyright 200X ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX...$10.00. properly eliminate aggressive strategies and preserve coop-erative strategies can evolve cooperative modes under the pure egoistic assumption. 1