Presidential Budgetary Duties

As an essential element of republican government, Congress possesses the power of the purse. It uses that authority to control Presidents and executive agencies. From the start, however, there has always been tension between the two elected branches, with Presidents insisting on exercising control over departments and agencies. A major collision occurred during the 1970s, when President Nixon claimed constitutional authority to refuse to spend appropriated funds (the impoundment dispute). He lost that battle in Congress and in the courts. Other issues include covert spending, Gramm-Rudman, Iran-Contra, item vetoes, legislative vetoes, and efforts in recent decades to control the national debt. When the framers drafted and debated the Constitution, the powers over war and spending were considered essential to legislative prerogatives and republican government. Much of the war power has drifted to the President, especially after World War II. Beginning with Harry Truman’s war against North Korea in 1950, Presidents have repeatedly insisted that they may obtain authority to use military force not from Congress but from the UN Security Council and NATO (Fisher 1997). The most recent example of this exercise of presidential power is the military operation by President Barack Obama in Libya in 2011 (Fisher 2012). Unilateral presidential decisions to commit U.S. troops to hostilities result in financial obligations that must be paid by Congress, even if it had no role in the commitment