Topics
auction formatsElection
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative advantage by investment prior to the auction. We find that, as predicted by theory, bidders invest more often prior to second price auctions than prior to first price auctions. In both auction formats bidding is more aggressive than the equilibrium prediction. However, bidding is closer to equilibrium than in control treatments where the comparative advantage is exogenous
Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design a...
We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players re...
Experiments on second-price sealed-bid private value auctions have established that subjects typical...
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative...
We experimentally analyze first- and second-price procurement auctions where one bidder can achieve ...
Abstract: We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect ...
We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect value esti...
Though many real life auctions are run independently of each other, from the bidders\u27 point of vi...
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the performance of first-price and second-price auctions wh...
Though many real life auctions are run independently of each other, from the bidders' point of view ...
In this paper we study equilibrium- and experimental bidding behaviour in first-price and second pri...
This analysis employs a uniform 4th price sealed-bid auction to test the impact of endowment heterog...
This paper investigates implications of some of the well established behavioral biases to the behavi...
In experimental auctions, participants are asually given an initial endowment or cash compensation t...
Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design a...
We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players re...
Experiments on second-price sealed-bid private value auctions have established that subjects typical...
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative...
We experimentally analyze first- and second-price procurement auctions where one bidder can achieve ...
Abstract: We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect ...
We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect value esti...
Though many real life auctions are run independently of each other, from the bidders\u27 point of vi...
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the performance of first-price and second-price auctions wh...
Though many real life auctions are run independently of each other, from the bidders' point of view ...
In this paper we study equilibrium- and experimental bidding behaviour in first-price and second pri...
This analysis employs a uniform 4th price sealed-bid auction to test the impact of endowment heterog...
This paper investigates implications of some of the well established behavioral biases to the behavi...
In experimental auctions, participants are asually given an initial endowment or cash compensation t...
Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design a...
We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players re...
Experiments on second-price sealed-bid private value auctions have established that subjects typical...
Add to ORKG