Going Outside is Easier Than Getting In: The Effect of Direct Democracy on Interest Group Lobbying Strategies

Baumgartner, Garrett Glasgow, Rod Kiewiet and Bob Sherman provided helpful comments and read drafts. Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech provided invaluable help during the development of the survey instrument. Laura Langer provided useful comments on a previous version of this paper presented at the 1999 APSA meeting. This paper explores the effect of the presence of the direct initiative process on interest groups ’ lobbying strategies, using survey data collected by the author. After outlining three hypotheses about how direct democracy will influence interest group lobbying, I use fac-tor analysis to determine the basic dimensions of lobbying and find evidence of a shift in strategies from a simple inside/outside dichotomy to a new modern inside lobbying strategy accompanied by the familiar outside lobbying strategy. I also find evidence of a new, third strategy, which I refer to as the issue entrepreneur dimension. I then construct factor scores to analyze the determinants of interest groups ’ lobbying strategies, with particular attention to how strategies differ both between groups in initiative and non-initiative states and be-tween initiative state groups who are involved for or against a particular initiative and those that are not. I find that groups in initiative states use outside strategies more and inside ones less. I also find that groups that are involved in potential initiatives may be able to use this leverage to increase their ability to inside lobby