Add to ORKGIn this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the re-lease of bad news to investors. 1
Companies must publish financial reports on time. When market information is more important and this...
Comparing with prior studies mainly focused on the effect of a certain event (it may be the initial ...
We examine whether the asymmetrical price response to bad and good earnings shocks changes as the re...
ABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency t...
Using a comprehensive sample of non-earnings 8-K filings from 2005 to 2013, we examine whether firms...
The market views bad-news management earnings forecasts as more credible than good-news forecasts no...
Mixed views exist about whether firm managers voluntarily disclose good news more timely than they d...
examine whether firms engage in opportunistic reporting of mandatory and voluntary news. We find str...
A manager may choose not to record the full extent of bad economic news reflected in negative stock ...
Previous studies reported firms management to release more bad news on Fridays compared to the rest...
We present a model in which some of the firm’s information (“new”) can be disclosed verifiably and s...
This paper explores whether managers strategically time the dissemination of bad news on sunny days ...
As informed traders, short sellers enhance the informativeness of stock prices, especially related t...
This study uses a historical setting in which expected litigation costs were low (i.e., Australia, f...
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allows firms to redact information from material contra...
Companies must publish financial reports on time. When market information is more important and this...
Comparing with prior studies mainly focused on the effect of a certain event (it may be the initial ...
We examine whether the asymmetrical price response to bad and good earnings shocks changes as the re...
ABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency t...
Using a comprehensive sample of non-earnings 8-K filings from 2005 to 2013, we examine whether firms...
The market views bad-news management earnings forecasts as more credible than good-news forecasts no...
Mixed views exist about whether firm managers voluntarily disclose good news more timely than they d...
examine whether firms engage in opportunistic reporting of mandatory and voluntary news. We find str...
A manager may choose not to record the full extent of bad economic news reflected in negative stock ...
Previous studies reported firms management to release more bad news on Fridays compared to the rest...
We present a model in which some of the firm’s information (“new”) can be disclosed verifiably and s...
This paper explores whether managers strategically time the dissemination of bad news on sunny days ...
As informed traders, short sellers enhance the informativeness of stock prices, especially related t...
This study uses a historical setting in which expected litigation costs were low (i.e., Australia, f...
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allows firms to redact information from material contra...
Companies must publish financial reports on time. When market information is more important and this...
Comparing with prior studies mainly focused on the effect of a certain event (it may be the initial ...
We examine whether the asymmetrical price response to bad and good earnings shocks changes as the re...