An important set of questions in economics concern how changes in the distribution of economic parameters (income, wealth, productivity, distortions, information, etc.) impact individual choices and market outcomes. We currently do not have tools to answer such questions. In this paper, I develop a theory of distributional comparative statics that addresses this set of issues. Central to the developments is a new concept called strategic risk-aversion which determines the outcome of most distributional comparative statics exercises. As illustrations I analyze the relationship between savings and inequality, ask how risk influences agents ’ behavior in Bayesian games, and study con-cavity of policy functions in general stochastic dynamic pro...
We provide general comparative static results for large finite and infinite-dimensional aggregative ...
This paper derives two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions on the comparative statics of cha...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...
Distributional comparative statics is the study of how individual decisions and equilibrium outcomes...
We propose a formal way to systematically study the differential effects of exogenous shocks in econ...
[[abstract]]The concept of "absolutely riskier than" is introduced to generalize Gollier's [1995] ne...
Risk aversion in game theory is usually modeled using expected utility, which was criticized early o...
In Chapter 1, I study decision problems under uncertainty involving the choice of a rule mapping st...
In this paper we study the comparative statics of Nth degree stochastic dominance shifts in a large ...
This paper presents results on comparative statics for a class of decision problems under uncertaint...
This paper attempts to find a relationship between agents' risk aversion and inequality of incomes. ...
In this article, it is shown that a wide range of comparative statics results from expected utility ...
We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise informa...
Analyses of risk-bearing often assume that agents face only one risk. Agents however usually face se...
Second-order stochastic dominance answers the question “Under what conditions will all risk-averse a...
We provide general comparative static results for large finite and infinite-dimensional aggregative ...
This paper derives two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions on the comparative statics of cha...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...
Distributional comparative statics is the study of how individual decisions and equilibrium outcomes...
We propose a formal way to systematically study the differential effects of exogenous shocks in econ...
[[abstract]]The concept of "absolutely riskier than" is introduced to generalize Gollier's [1995] ne...
Risk aversion in game theory is usually modeled using expected utility, which was criticized early o...
In Chapter 1, I study decision problems under uncertainty involving the choice of a rule mapping st...
In this paper we study the comparative statics of Nth degree stochastic dominance shifts in a large ...
This paper presents results on comparative statics for a class of decision problems under uncertaint...
This paper attempts to find a relationship between agents' risk aversion and inequality of incomes. ...
In this article, it is shown that a wide range of comparative statics results from expected utility ...
We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise informa...
Analyses of risk-bearing often assume that agents face only one risk. Agents however usually face se...
Second-order stochastic dominance answers the question “Under what conditions will all risk-averse a...
We provide general comparative static results for large finite and infinite-dimensional aggregative ...
This paper derives two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions on the comparative statics of cha...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...