On the risk of misbehaving RPKI authorities

The RPKI is a new security infrastructure that relies on trusted authorities to prevent some of the most devastating attacks on interdomain routing. The threat model for the RPKI sup-poses that authorities are trusted and routing is under attack. Here we discuss the risks that arise when this threat model is flipped: when RPKI authorities are faulty, misconfigured, compromised, or compelled to misbehave. We show how design decisions that elegantly address the vulnerabilities in the original threat model have unexpected side effects in this flipped threat model. In particular, we show new targeted at-tacks that allow RPKI authorities, under certain conditions, to limit access to IP prefixes, and discuss the risk that tran-sient RPKI faults can take IP prefixes offline. Our results suggest promising directions for future research, and have implications on the design of security architectures that are appropriate for the untrusted and error-prone Internet