1 How to combine and not to combine physics and metaphysics1

In this paper I will argue that if physics is to become a coherent metaphysics of nature it needs an “interpretation”. As I understand it, an interpretation of a physical theory amounts to offering (1) a precise formulation of its ontological claims and (2) a clear account of how such claims are related to the world of our experience. Notably, metaphysics enters importantly in both tasks: in (1), because interpreting our best physical theories requires going beyond a merely instrumentalist view of science; in (2), because a philosophical elaboration of the theories of the world that are implicit in our experience is one of the tasks of analytic metaphysics, and bridging possible explanatory gaps or even conflicts between the physical image and the manifest image of the world (Sellars 1963) is a typical philosophical task that involves both science and metaphysics. In order to defend this claim, in §1 I attack a widespread position about the relationship between metaphysics and science, namely the view that metaphysics is to be regarded as the a priori study of a space of possibilities, and science may enter in choosing among alternative accounts of such a space. In §2 I briefly criticize contemporary forms of physicalist chauvinism, which are mirrored by dual attitudes on the part of the metaphysicians who ignore science and then present my own view of the relationship between metaphysics and physics. §1 Metaphysics as the study of the possible An influential position in contemporary debate is that metaphysics is concerned with the study of a space of possibilities (Lowe 1998, 2011). The idea is that metaphysics studies the world not as it actually is (which is the task of science), but as it might be. 1 I thank the editors for some comments that improved the manuscript