NOT THE HOLE STORY: RELATIONALISM AND LOOP QUANTUM GRAVITY

Loop quantum gravity is a background-independent quantization of general relativity. Many of its proponents (e.g. Rovelli 1999, 2004) have long considered the theory to carry significant implications for the ontology of spacetime. In particular, they suggest that loop quantum gravity must be given a uniquely relationalist reading. Any form of substantivalism about spacetime (at least within the context of this theory of quantum gravity) is to be rejected. Dean Rickles (2005, 2006) and Oliver Pooley (2006) are among those who have raised doubts against this conviction. Rickles argues that a hole argument can be constructed for loop quantum gravity; he believes this to show that both substantivalist and relationalist interpretations of the theory are in fact possible. Pooley is sympathetic to Rickles ’ conclusion, but denies that an appropriate hole argument can be constructed. The discussion between Rickles and Pooley should therefore prompt us to at least review, and perhaps reconsider, the original arguments for background-independence in loop quantum gravity. Both the relationalist stance of Rovelli and Rickles ’ hole analogy seem to draw heavily on the traditional relationalist-substantivalist positions as they were developed in the context of the classical spacetime of general relativity. But do the commitments of either side change as we mov