Add to ORKGWe study information acquisition and dynamic withdrawal decisions when a spreading rumor exposes a solvent bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank’s liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire additional noisy signals. Depositors with less informative signals may wait before gradually running on the bank, leading to an endoge-nous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent-but-illiquid banks to runs, and shorten the survival time of failing banks. Public provision of solvency information can mitigate runs by indirectly crowding-out individual depositors ’ effort to acquire liquidity information. JEL Classification: D8, G
Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal...
A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regula...
This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that som...
We study information acquisition and withdrawal decisions when a liquidity event triggers a spreadin...
Bank runs are usually happened as such that depositors panic and following the consequence of intera...
I develop a dynamic model of bank runs that allows me to study important phenomena such as the role ...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We use a unique, new, database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run. We...
In the literature on bank runs where depositors decide whether to withdraw early from the bank or no...
This paper analyzes deposit contracts when banks face alternative types of bank runs. The bank in ou...
(Preliminary and incomplete: please do not circulate) We use unique, depositor-level data for a bank...
We use a unique, new, database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run. We...
I develop a dynamic model of bank runs that allows me to study important phenomena such as the role ...
A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regula...
In a banking model with imperfect information, I find that more precise information increases the ec...
Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal...
A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regula...
This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that som...
We study information acquisition and withdrawal decisions when a liquidity event triggers a spreadin...
Bank runs are usually happened as such that depositors panic and following the consequence of intera...
I develop a dynamic model of bank runs that allows me to study important phenomena such as the role ...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We use a unique, new, database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run. We...
In the literature on bank runs where depositors decide whether to withdraw early from the bank or no...
This paper analyzes deposit contracts when banks face alternative types of bank runs. The bank in ou...
(Preliminary and incomplete: please do not circulate) We use unique, depositor-level data for a bank...
We use a unique, new, database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run. We...
I develop a dynamic model of bank runs that allows me to study important phenomena such as the role ...
A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regula...
In a banking model with imperfect information, I find that more precise information increases the ec...
Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal...
A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regula...
This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that som...