Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential reg-ulator can in general not mitigate a bank’s failure risk solely by means of liquidity requirements. However, their effectiveness can be restored if, in addition, minimum capital requirements are met. This provides a rationale for capital requirements be-yond the commonly envoked reasoning that they are to be used to control the riski-ness of banks ’ asset portfolios. JEL classification: G21, G2
This paper presents a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model for the pur-pose of determining...
We investigate the effect of changes in capital regulation using a simple model of bank capital requ...
• Bank capital, and a bank’s liquidity position, are concepts that are central to understanding what...
Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential regulator can in gener...
In this Article I review the literature on the conceptual and analytical arguments for and against c...
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard...
Banks must maintain minimum capital levels, but a regulated balance sheet implies profit suboptimiza...
Copyright © 2013 Christopher Henderson, Julapa Jagtiani. This is an open access article distributed ...
This paper considers a model of information-based bank runs where a central bank sets its lender of ...
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selec-tion of and moral hazard...
Abstract: A bank closure policy problem is analysed in a mathematical model within a Black-Scholes f...
This chapter takes into consideration the raising of capital from time to time or the improving of r...
Abstract: A bank closure policy problem is analysed in a model within a real option framework where ...
Basel III introduced unweighted capital standard and new regulatory liquidity standards to complemen...
This dissertation includes three essays on Basel III. Basel III is considered as the most comprehens...
This paper presents a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model for the pur-pose of determining...
We investigate the effect of changes in capital regulation using a simple model of bank capital requ...
• Bank capital, and a bank’s liquidity position, are concepts that are central to understanding what...
Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential regulator can in gener...
In this Article I review the literature on the conceptual and analytical arguments for and against c...
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard...
Banks must maintain minimum capital levels, but a regulated balance sheet implies profit suboptimiza...
Copyright © 2013 Christopher Henderson, Julapa Jagtiani. This is an open access article distributed ...
This paper considers a model of information-based bank runs where a central bank sets its lender of ...
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selec-tion of and moral hazard...
Abstract: A bank closure policy problem is analysed in a mathematical model within a Black-Scholes f...
This chapter takes into consideration the raising of capital from time to time or the improving of r...
Abstract: A bank closure policy problem is analysed in a model within a real option framework where ...
Basel III introduced unweighted capital standard and new regulatory liquidity standards to complemen...
This dissertation includes three essays on Basel III. Basel III is considered as the most comprehens...
This paper presents a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model for the pur-pose of determining...
We investigate the effect of changes in capital regulation using a simple model of bank capital requ...
• Bank capital, and a bank’s liquidity position, are concepts that are central to understanding what...