Adversarial patrolling games (APGs) can be modeled as Stackelberg games where a patroller and an intruder com-pete. The former moves with the aim of detecting an intru-sion, while the latter tries to intrude without being detected. In this paper, we introduce alarms in APGs, namely devices that can remotely inform the patroller about the presence of the intruder at some location. We introduce a basic model, provide an extended formulation of the problem and show how it can be cast as partially observable stochastic game. We then introduce the general resolution approach
Abstract—Patrolling environments by means of autonomous mobile robots has received an increasing att...
Critical infrastructure protection becomes increasingly a major concern in governments and industrie...
Patrolling games are partially observable games played by two players, the defender and the attacker...
Abstract Defender-Attacker Stackelberg games are the foundations of tools deployed for computing opt...
Security games are gaining significant interest in artificial intelligence. They are characterized b...
AbstractSecurity games are gaining significant interest in artificial intelligence. They are charact...
We propose, to the best of our knowledge, the first Security Game where a Defender is supported by a...
In patrolling, an agent perceives portions of an environment to detect the presence of an intruder. ...
Motivated by a number of security applications, among which border patrolling, we study, to the best...
Stackelberg games form the core of a number of tools deployed for computing optimal patrolling strat...
Abstract—In patrolling, an agent perceives portions of an environment to detect the presence of an i...
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2...
When securing complex infrastructures or large environments, constant surveillance of every area is ...
Patrolling-intrusion games are recently receiving more and more attention in the literature. They ar...
A key operational problem for those charged with the security of vulnerable facilities (such as airp...
Abstract—Patrolling environments by means of autonomous mobile robots has received an increasing att...
Critical infrastructure protection becomes increasingly a major concern in governments and industrie...
Patrolling games are partially observable games played by two players, the defender and the attacker...
Abstract Defender-Attacker Stackelberg games are the foundations of tools deployed for computing opt...
Security games are gaining significant interest in artificial intelligence. They are characterized b...
AbstractSecurity games are gaining significant interest in artificial intelligence. They are charact...
We propose, to the best of our knowledge, the first Security Game where a Defender is supported by a...
In patrolling, an agent perceives portions of an environment to detect the presence of an intruder. ...
Motivated by a number of security applications, among which border patrolling, we study, to the best...
Stackelberg games form the core of a number of tools deployed for computing optimal patrolling strat...
Abstract—In patrolling, an agent perceives portions of an environment to detect the presence of an i...
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2...
When securing complex infrastructures or large environments, constant surveillance of every area is ...
Patrolling-intrusion games are recently receiving more and more attention in the literature. They ar...
A key operational problem for those charged with the security of vulnerable facilities (such as airp...
Abstract—Patrolling environments by means of autonomous mobile robots has received an increasing att...
Critical infrastructure protection becomes increasingly a major concern in governments and industrie...
Patrolling games are partially observable games played by two players, the defender and the attacker...