Abstract. Cryptographic protocols with single blind copying were defined and modeled by Comon and Cortier using the new class C of first order clauses, which extends the Skolem class. They showed its satisfiability problem to be in 3-DEXPTIME. We improve this result by showing that satisfiability for this class is NEXPTIME-complete, using new resolution techniques. We show satisfiabil-ity to be DEXPTIME-complete if clauses are Horn, which is what is required for modeling cryptographic protocols. While translation to Horn clauses only gives a DEXPTIME upper bound for the secrecy problem for these protocols, we further show that this secrecy problem is actually DEXPTIME-complete.
Cette thèse se situe dans le cadre de l'analyse symbolique des protocoles Les contributions sont rep...
In a proof of partial knowledge, introduced by Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers (CRYPTO 1994), a pro...
AbstractThis volume contains the Proceedings of the First Workshop on Logical Aspects of Cryptograph...
Formal methods have proved to be very useful for analyzing cryptographic protocols. However, most ex...
The secrecy problem for security protocols is the problem to decide whether or not a given security ...
International audienceThis chapter presents a method for verifying security protocols based on an ab...
We show how cryptographic protocols using Di#e-Hellman primitives, i.e., modular exponentiation on a...
Abstract. This chapter presents a method for verifying security protocols based on an abstract repre...
This thesis is developed in the framework of the symbolic analysis of security protocols. The contri...
AbstractWe show how cryptographic protocols using Diffie–Hellman primitives, i.e., modular exponenti...
This thesis is about the formal verification and composition of security protocols, motivated by app...
We introduce a class of tree automata that perform tests on a memory that is updated using function ...
We consider the problem of verifying the security of finitely many sessions of a protocol that toss...
The main aim of this thesis is to construct efficient protocols to help preserve privacy of users in...
We provide a treatment of encryption and zero-knowledge in terms of uniform complexity measures. Thi...
Cette thèse se situe dans le cadre de l'analyse symbolique des protocoles Les contributions sont rep...
In a proof of partial knowledge, introduced by Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers (CRYPTO 1994), a pro...
AbstractThis volume contains the Proceedings of the First Workshop on Logical Aspects of Cryptograph...
Formal methods have proved to be very useful for analyzing cryptographic protocols. However, most ex...
The secrecy problem for security protocols is the problem to decide whether or not a given security ...
International audienceThis chapter presents a method for verifying security protocols based on an ab...
We show how cryptographic protocols using Di#e-Hellman primitives, i.e., modular exponentiation on a...
Abstract. This chapter presents a method for verifying security protocols based on an abstract repre...
This thesis is developed in the framework of the symbolic analysis of security protocols. The contri...
AbstractWe show how cryptographic protocols using Diffie–Hellman primitives, i.e., modular exponenti...
This thesis is about the formal verification and composition of security protocols, motivated by app...
We introduce a class of tree automata that perform tests on a memory that is updated using function ...
We consider the problem of verifying the security of finitely many sessions of a protocol that toss...
The main aim of this thesis is to construct efficient protocols to help preserve privacy of users in...
We provide a treatment of encryption and zero-knowledge in terms of uniform complexity measures. Thi...
Cette thèse se situe dans le cadre de l'analyse symbolique des protocoles Les contributions sont rep...
In a proof of partial knowledge, introduced by Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers (CRYPTO 1994), a pro...
AbstractThis volume contains the Proceedings of the First Workshop on Logical Aspects of Cryptograph...