Concepts, perception and the dual process theories of mind

ABSTRACT: In this article we argue that the problem of the re-lationships between concepts and perception in cognitive science is blurred by the fact that the very notion of concept is rather con-fused. Since it is not always clear exactly what concepts are, it is not easy to say, for example, whether and in what measure con-cept possession involves entertaining and manipulating percep-tual representations, whether concepts are entirely different from perceptual representations, and so on. As a paradigmatic example of this state of affairs, we will start by taking into consideration the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. The analysis of such a distinction will lead us to the conclusion that concept is a heterogeneous notion. Then we shall take into account the so called dual process theories of mind; this approach also points to concepts being a heterogeneous phenomenon: dif-ferent aspects of conceptual competence are likely to be ascribed to different types of systems. We conclude that without a clear specification of what concepts are, the problem of the relation-ships between concepts and perception is somewhat ill-posed. Dual process theories 2 1