Original Paper UDC 159.947.5: 111.6

Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of inten-tionality that goes with the exercise of free will. Consider the following scenario. I am walking along a road and as I round a bend I see that a car went off the road, down a small hill, and hit a tree. I also see that this has just recently happened because the driver is still in-side the car. Two other cars have stopped and two people from these cars are on their way down to help the accident victim. I hesitate, stopping at the side of the road. Should I also go down and offer some help? Perhaps I would be only redundant and get in the way of helping the person; but I have a cell phone and could call an ambulance – should I stay here and cal