Materialism Against Belief in the Existence of Cartesian Mind–Body Dualism

Abstract I discuss fi ve basic objections that materialists often raise to Cartesian Mind-Body Dualism: (1) It is not empirically testable or confi rmable; (2) It is in principle testable and confi rmable, but unconfi rmed; (3) It is testable and confi rmable, but has been shown false; (4) It is unnecessary to explain anything; (5) It cannot serve to explain anything. I will show how unsatisfactory all these objections are. If I am right in what I argue the reductionist posture of contemporary materialism against the existence of Cartesian Immaterial Substances as causal agents in explain-ing human behavior is demonstrably more dogma than anything else. Moreover, the promise of reductive materialism to explain human personality, consciousness, and behavior is unlikely ever to be fulfi lled. Unfortunately, limits on space here prevent a discussion of more positive, empirical research from reincarnation studies and voluntary out-of-body experi-ments providing solid empirical or scientifi c evidence affi rming both the existence of Cartesian Immaterial Substances and some form of personal survival after biological death. So, even though I will not be able to argue here that we have a well-confi rmed scientifi c belief that there are Cartesian Immaterial causes of human behavior that undermine explanations in usual reductionist efforts, we can at least show why the standard and pervasive objections from reductive materialism fail by way of seeking to show that Cartesian Mind-Body Dualism is false