We provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take social preferences, a concern for the outcomes achieved by other reference agents, seriously. Although we show that student measures of social preference elicited in an experiment have little external validity when compared to measures obtained from a field experiment with a population of partici-pants who face a social dilemma in their daily lives (i.e., team production), we do find strong links between the social preferences of our field partic-ipants and their productivity at work. We also find that the stock of social preferences evolves endogeously with respect to how widely team production is utilized
A number of competing social preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from eco...
We present a wide collection of experiments which show how human behavior deviates substantially wit...
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a menu of experimental games that are useful for measurin...
In addition to showing that student measures of social preference, a concern for outcomes achieved b...
We provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take social preferences, a concern for the...
A critical question facing experimental economists is whether behavior inside the laboratory is a go...
We replicate in the laboratory an artefactual field experiment originally designed to investigate th...
International audienceWe conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferenc...
We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to c...
Traditional economic theory has found in experimental economics a source of both support and challen...
We present a lab-field experiment designed to assess systematically the external validity of social ...
This paper explores some issues having to do with the use of experimental results from one shot game...
A number of competing social preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from eco...
Models of job tournaments and competitive workplaces more generally predict that while in-dividual e...
This paper presents evidence which challenges the view that techniques which are designed to measure...
A number of competing social preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from eco...
We present a wide collection of experiments which show how human behavior deviates substantially wit...
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a menu of experimental games that are useful for measurin...
In addition to showing that student measures of social preference, a concern for outcomes achieved b...
We provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take social preferences, a concern for the...
A critical question facing experimental economists is whether behavior inside the laboratory is a go...
We replicate in the laboratory an artefactual field experiment originally designed to investigate th...
International audienceWe conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferenc...
We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to c...
Traditional economic theory has found in experimental economics a source of both support and challen...
We present a lab-field experiment designed to assess systematically the external validity of social ...
This paper explores some issues having to do with the use of experimental results from one shot game...
A number of competing social preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from eco...
Models of job tournaments and competitive workplaces more generally predict that while in-dividual e...
This paper presents evidence which challenges the view that techniques which are designed to measure...
A number of competing social preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from eco...
We present a wide collection of experiments which show how human behavior deviates substantially wit...
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a menu of experimental games that are useful for measurin...