Taking location as given, we study imperfect competition on a circular city. In Bertrand oligopoly, we identify price harmonics as a function of firm unit costs and locations. The sum of oligopoly profits is larger when costs and/or locations are more dispersed in the ‘dihedral majorization ’ sense. This also tends to be the case in which prices are more variable. We study how phase shifts between cost parameters and inter-firm distance parameters change production and oligopoly profits. An exact characterization of production patterns is developed in terms of the eigenvalues for what we call the price harmonics matrix. The same techniques are applied to Cournot oligopoly with spatial externalities on Circular City. Solutions are compared w...
The authors analyze a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then ch...
We derive the closed-form solution characterizing the equilibrium in a circular-city model with comp...
We consider a two-stage non-cooperative Bertrand game with location choice involving "r" firms. Ther...
We investigate the equilibrium location pattern and welfare implication in delivered pricing model (...
As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations ...
This paper reconsiders Bertrand duopoly and oligopoly in the spatial formulation due to Hotelling, 1...
A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consum...
This paper presents a spatial economy in the spirit of the so called “new economic geography ” liter...
In this paper, we consider oligopolistic competition in a spatial model when firms take care of good...
This paper deals with the impact of the variation in the cost of transport upon the equilibrium of a...
An oligopoly with spatially dispersed producers and consumers and with multi-period demands is model...
One of the most pervasive characteristics of mature oligopolistic industries is their reluctance to ...
[[abstract]]This paper departs from earlier work on location theory under uncertainty by considering...
We study the location-then-price game played by two firms in a circular market when consumers face n...
For an even number of firms with identical transport cost, spatial Cournot competition in a circular...
The authors analyze a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then ch...
We derive the closed-form solution characterizing the equilibrium in a circular-city model with comp...
We consider a two-stage non-cooperative Bertrand game with location choice involving "r" firms. Ther...
We investigate the equilibrium location pattern and welfare implication in delivered pricing model (...
As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations ...
This paper reconsiders Bertrand duopoly and oligopoly in the spatial formulation due to Hotelling, 1...
A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consum...
This paper presents a spatial economy in the spirit of the so called “new economic geography ” liter...
In this paper, we consider oligopolistic competition in a spatial model when firms take care of good...
This paper deals with the impact of the variation in the cost of transport upon the equilibrium of a...
An oligopoly with spatially dispersed producers and consumers and with multi-period demands is model...
One of the most pervasive characteristics of mature oligopolistic industries is their reluctance to ...
[[abstract]]This paper departs from earlier work on location theory under uncertainty by considering...
We study the location-then-price game played by two firms in a circular market when consumers face n...
For an even number of firms with identical transport cost, spatial Cournot competition in a circular...
The authors analyze a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then ch...
We derive the closed-form solution characterizing the equilibrium in a circular-city model with comp...
We consider a two-stage non-cooperative Bertrand game with location choice involving "r" firms. Ther...