CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (1.1)

The first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王 充 has largely escaped the attention of comparative philosophers. That this oversight is undeserved is shown by two journal articles and an encyclopedia entry by Alexus McLeod (2007; 2011; 2012). McLeod sketches an intriguing picture of a philosopher whose style and approach to philosophy reminds more of analytic philosophy than of popular images of Chinese philosophy. Wang Chong preferred clear and direct argument to the “flowery and artificial writing ” (華偽之文) that he perceived to be customary in his day, 1 adhered to a kind of metaphysical realism, and advocated a two-faced philosophical method of questioning (wen 問) what is unclear and challenging (nan 難) what is false or invalid.2 While McLeod deserves praise for making Wang Chong more accessible to a Western audience, I have my doubts about his analysis of Wang Chong’s theory of truth as presented in this journal (see McLeod 2011). McLeod argues that Wang Chong implicitly adhered to a kind of pluralism about truth somewhat similar to the theories defended by Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch in the last two decades, and even improves on those by solving the problem of mixed discourse. In this response to McLeod, I want to challenge (aspects of) this interpretation of Wang Chong, and suggest a kind of “quasi-pluralism ” that builds on both McLeod’s pluralist interpretation and my critique thereof