In this letter we briefly survey our main result from [Babaioff el al. 2014]: a simple and approx-imately revenue-optimal mechanism for a monopolist who wants to sell a variety of items to a single buyer with an additive valuation
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b], as lo...
none2This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms...
We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who ...
We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in ...
We demonstrate the existence of an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling ...
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer’s ...
Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We ...
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of $nonmonot...
We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer’s valuatio...
We solve for the optimal mechanism for selling two goods when the buyer’s demand characteristics are...
Myerson’s 1981 characterization of revenue-optimal auctions for single-dimensional agents follows fr...
This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling an indivisible good to consumers who may be budget...
We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's v...
We consider the problem of finding the mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a seller of multiple ...
The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer’s valuation for those objects. The sel...
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b], as lo...
none2This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms...
We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who ...
We analyze the nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incomplete information monopolist operating in ...
We demonstrate the existence of an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling ...
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer’s ...
Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We ...
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of $nonmonot...
We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer’s valuatio...
We solve for the optimal mechanism for selling two goods when the buyer’s demand characteristics are...
Myerson’s 1981 characterization of revenue-optimal auctions for single-dimensional agents follows fr...
This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling an indivisible good to consumers who may be budget...
We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's v...
We consider the problem of finding the mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a seller of multiple ...
The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer’s valuation for those objects. The sel...
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings [Cai et al. 2012b], as lo...
none2This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms...
We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who ...
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