Dual-process models imply that automatic attitudes should be less flexible than their self-reported counterparts; the relevant empirical record, however, is mixed. To advance the debate, the authors conducted 4 experiments investigating how readily automatic preferences for one imagined social group over another could be induced or reversed. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that automatic preferences, like self-reported ones, could be readily induced by both abstract supposition and concrete learning. In contrast, Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that newly formed automatic preferences, unlike self-reported ones, could not be readily reversed by either abstract supposition or concrete learning. Thus, the relative inflexibility of implicit attitudes...
Attitudes are at the heart of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), but problems in defining and meas...
Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. H...
Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. H...
Dual-process models imply that automatic attitudes should be less flexible than their self-reported ...
Implicit attitudes have recently been distinguished from explicit attitudes (Greenwald ; Banaji, 199...
ABSTRACT—Response latency measures have yielded an explo-sion of interest in implicit attitudes. Les...
In the present article we re-examine one of the most deeply entrenched assumptions in modern attitud...
© 2013 Dr. Juan Jose MuzioRecent research has demonstrated that people can have dual-attitudes which...
ABSTRACT—Because different processes underlie implicit and explicit attitudes, we hypothesized that ...
Evidence suggests that while explicit evaluations of others are easily formed and equally easily cha...
The ability to produce meaningful evaluations of the external world (i.e., attitudes) is critical fo...
Starting from the basic claim of the Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s APE model, the aim of this essay wa...
Starting from the basic claim of the Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s APE model, the aim of this essay wa...
Implicit attitudes are defined as unconsciously-formed evaluations towards an object or the self. Al...
The formation of attitudes toward novel objects was examined as a function of exploratory behavior. ...
Attitudes are at the heart of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), but problems in defining and meas...
Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. H...
Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. H...
Dual-process models imply that automatic attitudes should be less flexible than their self-reported ...
Implicit attitudes have recently been distinguished from explicit attitudes (Greenwald ; Banaji, 199...
ABSTRACT—Response latency measures have yielded an explo-sion of interest in implicit attitudes. Les...
In the present article we re-examine one of the most deeply entrenched assumptions in modern attitud...
© 2013 Dr. Juan Jose MuzioRecent research has demonstrated that people can have dual-attitudes which...
ABSTRACT—Because different processes underlie implicit and explicit attitudes, we hypothesized that ...
Evidence suggests that while explicit evaluations of others are easily formed and equally easily cha...
The ability to produce meaningful evaluations of the external world (i.e., attitudes) is critical fo...
Starting from the basic claim of the Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s APE model, the aim of this essay wa...
Starting from the basic claim of the Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s APE model, the aim of this essay wa...
Implicit attitudes are defined as unconsciously-formed evaluations towards an object or the self. Al...
The formation of attitudes toward novel objects was examined as a function of exploratory behavior. ...
Attitudes are at the heart of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), but problems in defining and meas...
Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. H...
Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. H...