Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior∗

An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. When several monitoring intensities lead to an observationally identical outcome, only the minimum of these can be implemented, which can lead to under-enforcement. A comparative statics analysis reveals that increasing the expected punishment can lead to less deterrence, since the maximal implementable monitoring intensity decreases. When the agent is strongly intrinsically motivated to curb crime, our results are mirrored and only high monitoring intensities can be implemented. Then, higher monetary rewards for detections lead to a lower monitoring intensity and to a higher level of misbehavior