Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning

David Chalmers's two-dimensionalism purports to provide a framework for thinking about meaning and mental content that can provide substantial insight into rationality, modality, and the nature of mind. Such an ambitious program cannot but provoke opposi-tion, and there have been a number of prominent critiques of two-dimensionalism. But much of this opposition is based on misunderstanding. A number of in uential criticisms turn on interpreting two-dimensionalism as involving the view that the meanings of names can be given by descriptions associated with them by speakers.1 But the best current version of two-dimensionalism { the view developed in Chalmers's recent work (Chalmers, 2002a, 2006, 2007) { is not descriptivist, and is not so easily refuted. Two-dimensionalism is a serious contender, a view to be reckoned with. In Chalmers's hands, it promises to provide both an account of the cognitive signicance of our thoughts, and a useful systematisation of the role of conceivability in modal epistemology, especially as it bears on Kripke/Putnam-style necessary aposteriori. Ultimately, however, I will argue that this promise is not fullled. Chalmers's development of 2D mimics Carnap's devel-opment of his own semantic views.2 I maintain that Chalmers's Carnapian program face