iSolving the Prot Sharing Problem through Negotiations with Information Conrmation Processes

KATAYAMA These days, the profit sharing problem is occurring in several fields. If the field is joint-stock cooperation, we can divide the profit with the ratio of its stock holders ’ holdings, but if there is not hierarchical structure, and we cannot de-termine imputation with top-down, we cannot solve the profit sharing problem simply. For example, the profit sharing problem in the composite web service which is made by several atomic services, the problem how to divide the profit produced by the composite web service is difficult. In these kinds of problems we can apply theory of cooperative game. Especially, we use n player cooperative game, which is for how to make the coalition with the members and how to di-vide the profit produced by the coalition. For example, Shapley value proposed in cooperative game theory enables fairly division in sense of the value satisfies several axioms. But to calculate imputation with cooperative game theory like Shapley value, we need to know all characteristic function values which are th