Data biased robust counter strategies

The problem of exploiting information about the environment while still being robust to inaccu-rate or incomplete information arises in many domains. Competitive imperfect information games where the goal is to maximally exploit an unknown opponent’s weaknesses are an example of this problem. Agents for these games must balance two objectives. First, they should aim to exploit data from past interactions with the op-ponent, seeking a best-response counter strategy. Second, they should aim to minimize losses since the limited data may be misleading or the oppo-nent’s strategy may have changed, suggesting an opponent-agnostic Nash equilibrium strategy. In this paper, we show how to partially satisfy both of these objectives at the same time, producing strategies with favourable tradeoffs between the ability to exploit an opponent and the capacity to be exploited. Like a recently published tech-nique, our approach involves solving a modified game; however the result is more generally appli-cable and even performs well in situations with very limited data. We evaluate our technique in the game of two-player, Limit Texas Hold’em.