Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation

It seems to many that moral opinions must make a difference to what we’re motivated to do, at least in suitable conditions. To others, it seems that it is possible to have genuine moral opinions that make no motivational difference. Both sides – internalists and externalists about moral motivation – can tell persuasive stories of actual and hypothetical cases. Both sides can also offer a plausible deeper rationale for their picture of moral motivation. Internalists appeal to the distinctive practicality of morality, without which the practice of judging would seem to lack a point. Externalists emphasize the many belief-like features of moral judgment and the motivational inertness of belief, offering an explanation of practicality in terms of typical features of human nature. It is thus no wonder that the philosophical community has failed to reach a consensus on moral motivation. Since both sides make a good case, it should be worth exploring the possibility that they are both in the right about something. My proposal for a kind of reconciliation begins by distinguishing between two kinds of psychological states with moral content. Call this Moral Thought Pluralism. According to it, there are, first, psychological states that may be labelled moral intuitions. They are spontaneous and compelling non-doxastic appearances o