The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Abstract: A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many di¤erent) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously \u85xed number of units. We de\u85ne a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by only using linear programming. We show that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price We thank Ester Camiña, John Hat\u85eld, and Alejandro Manelli for their very helpful comments. The work of D. Jaume and A. Neme is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis through grant 319502 and by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientí\u85cas y Técnicas (CONICET) throug