Distance-bounding facing both mafia and

Abstract. Contactless technologies such as RFID, NFC, and sensor net-works are vulnerable to mafia and distance frauds. Both frauds aim at passing an authentication protocol by cheating on the actual distance be-tween the prover and the verifier. To cope these security issues, distance-bounding protocols have been designed. However, none of the current proposals simultaneously resists to these two frauds without requiring additional memory and computation. The situation is even worse con-sidering that just a few distance-bounding protocols are able to deal with the inherent background noise on the communication channels. This ar-ticle introduces a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol that resists to both mafia and distance frauds. The security of the protocol is ana-lyzed with respect to these two frauds in both scenarios, namely noisy and noiseless channels. Analytical expressions for the adversary’s suc-cess probabilities are provided, and are illustrated by experimental re-sults. The analysis, performed in an already existing framework for fair-ness reasons, demonstrates the undeniable advantage of the introduced lightweight design over the previous proposals