Learning what is where from social observations

Observing the actions of other people allows us to learn not only about their mental states, but also about hidden aspects of a shared environmental situation – things we cannot see, but they can, and that influence their behavior in predictable ways. This paper presents a computational model of how peo-ple can learn about the world through these social inferences, supported by the same Theory of Mind (ToM) that enables rep-resenting and reasoning about an agent’s mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. The model is an extension of the Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) model of Baker et al. (2011), which treats observed intentional actions as the output of an approximately rational planning process and then rea-sons backwards to infer the most likely inputs to the agent’s planner – in this case, the locations and states of utility sources (potential goal objects) in the environment. We conducted a large-scale experiment comparing the world-state inferences of the BToM model and those of human subjects, given observa-tions of agents moving along various trajectories in simple spa-tial environments. The model quantitatively predicts subjects’ graded beliefs about possible world states with high accuracy – and substantially better than a non-mentalistic feature-based model with many more free parameters. These results show the power of social learning for acquiring surprisingly fine-grained knowledge about the world