Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass Penultimate draft

Abstract: This paper compares and relates tracking and phenomenal theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal theories over tracking theories. Some mental states are “of ” or about something. For example, your belief that Pegasus has wings seems to be about Pegasus and his wingedness, and your visual experience of a cup presents or is about a cup. This directness of mental states is intentionality. Intentional states are states that exhibit intentionality; what they represent is their content. The 1980s and 1990s saw the rise of tracking theories of intentionality, theories that aim to understand intentionality in terms of tracking or suitably co-varying with items in the environment. These theories have been motivated in good part by a perceived need to “naturalize ” intentionality. Though tracking theories faced various challenges, many were considered to be merely technical, and research proceeded with much optimism. Tracking theories arguably remain the most popular theories o