iAnalyzing the Effect of Preference Signaling in Job Markets

In recent years, lengthening job hunting for new graduates has been a problem. In job matching markets for new graduates, the matching between firms and students takes place in short term intensively. In fact, most of firms start to make offers to students at the beginning of April and finish their recruitment in June. Due to such a congestion, there are many students who can not get any job offers and they have to continue their job hunting while there are some students can get some job offers at early stages. The reason why it happened is the students ’ tendency to apply for the large firms which are popular among many students. In addition such behaviors result in missing their chances of getting job offers from firms which might make offers to them if they would have applied at early stages. In two-side matching between such firms and students, preference signaling is usually helpful to facilitate matches in such a market. Preference signaling means a mechanism where each student can send a signal of interest to on