Add to ORKGWe analyze strategic speculators incentives to trade on information in a model where rm value is endogenous to trading, due to feedback from the \u85nancial market to corpo-rate decisions. Trading reveals private information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental value. This feedback e¤ect has an asymmetric e¤ect on trading behavior as it increases (reduces) the pro\u85tability of buying (selling) on good (bad) news. This gives rise to an endogenous limit to arbitrage, whereby investors may refrain from trading on negative information. Thus, bad news is incorporated more slowly into prices than good news, potentially leading to overinvestment
Abstract：Positive Feedback Trading strategies are selling during market declines and buying during m...
We build a game theoretical model to examine how the level of information advantage of insiders and ...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
We analyze strategic speculators incentives to trade on information in a model where rm value is en...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is ...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is ...
Abstract This paper identi…es a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a …rm's funda...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model One of the core...
This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises because firm value is endogenous to the explo...
This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a firm's fundamental value...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
This article combines the continuous arrival of information with the infrequency of trades and inves...
We study the use of trading strategies and their profitability in experimental asset markets with as...
This article investigates the impacts of asymmetric information within a Lucas (1978) asset pricing ...
This paper studies corporate hedging when investors cannot observe firms' hedging strategies but onl...
Abstract：Positive Feedback Trading strategies are selling during market declines and buying during m...
We build a game theoretical model to examine how the level of information advantage of insiders and ...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
We analyze strategic speculators incentives to trade on information in a model where rm value is en...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is ...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is ...
Abstract This paper identi…es a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a …rm's funda...
We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model One of the core...
This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises because firm value is endogenous to the explo...
This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a firm's fundamental value...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...
This article combines the continuous arrival of information with the infrequency of trades and inves...
We study the use of trading strategies and their profitability in experimental asset markets with as...
This article investigates the impacts of asymmetric information within a Lucas (1978) asset pricing ...
This paper studies corporate hedging when investors cannot observe firms' hedging strategies but onl...
Abstract：Positive Feedback Trading strategies are selling during market declines and buying during m...
We build a game theoretical model to examine how the level of information advantage of insiders and ...
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who ...