Abstract. In an e-marketplace populated with a large number of sell-ers, some of which may be dishonest, the selection of good sellers to do business with is crucial but challenging especially when buyers do not have much experience with these sellers. In this paper we introduce the SALE POMDP, a framework for the seller selection problem that allows the decision maker to reason both about the quality of the sellers, as well as the trustworthiness of the advisors. In particular, the framework allows the agent to ask advisors about the trustworthiness of other ad-visors while still offering the benefit of optimally trading off information gathering and exploitation of knowledge as afforded by a POMDP based approach. Via this model, we presen...
In multiagent e-markets, trust between interaction partners (buying agents and selling agents) is vi...
In multiagent e-markets, trust between interaction partners (buying agents and selling agents) is vi...
In this paper, we propose a novel incentive mechanism for promoting honesty in electronic marketplac...
Selecting a seller in e-markets is a tedious task that we might want to delegate to an agent. Many a...
Selecting a seller in e-markets is a tedious task that we might want to delegate to an agent. Many a...
In multiagent e-marketplaces, buying agents need to select good sellers by querying other buyers (ca...
In this article, we present a framework of use in electronic marketplaces that allows buying agents ...
In this article, we present a framework of use in electronic marketplaces that allows buying agents ...
In multiagent e-marketplaces, buying agents need to select good sellers by querying other buyers (ca...
In this paper, we examine the application of electronic mar-ketplaces, populated by buying and selli...
Trust has been recognized as a vital concept in open MultiAgent Systems (MASs), where autonomous age...
Trust has been recognized as a vital concept in open MultiAgent Systems (MASs), where autonomous age...
In this paper, we propose a reputation oriented re-inforcement learning algorithm for buying and sel...
In electronic marketplaces populated by self-interested agents, buyer agents would benefit by modeli...
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, includ...
In multiagent e-markets, trust between interaction partners (buying agents and selling agents) is vi...
In multiagent e-markets, trust between interaction partners (buying agents and selling agents) is vi...
In this paper, we propose a novel incentive mechanism for promoting honesty in electronic marketplac...
Selecting a seller in e-markets is a tedious task that we might want to delegate to an agent. Many a...
Selecting a seller in e-markets is a tedious task that we might want to delegate to an agent. Many a...
In multiagent e-marketplaces, buying agents need to select good sellers by querying other buyers (ca...
In this article, we present a framework of use in electronic marketplaces that allows buying agents ...
In this article, we present a framework of use in electronic marketplaces that allows buying agents ...
In multiagent e-marketplaces, buying agents need to select good sellers by querying other buyers (ca...
In this paper, we examine the application of electronic mar-ketplaces, populated by buying and selli...
Trust has been recognized as a vital concept in open MultiAgent Systems (MASs), where autonomous age...
Trust has been recognized as a vital concept in open MultiAgent Systems (MASs), where autonomous age...
In this paper, we propose a reputation oriented re-inforcement learning algorithm for buying and sel...
In electronic marketplaces populated by self-interested agents, buyer agents would benefit by modeli...
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, includ...
In multiagent e-markets, trust between interaction partners (buying agents and selling agents) is vi...
In multiagent e-markets, trust between interaction partners (buying agents and selling agents) is vi...
In this paper, we propose a novel incentive mechanism for promoting honesty in electronic marketplac...