Abstract. Secure two-party computation enables applications in which partic-ipants compute the output of a function that depends on their private inputs, without revealing those inputs or relying on any trusted third party. In this pa-per, we show the potential of building privacy-preserving applications using gar-bled circuits, a generic technique that until recently was believed to be too ineffi-cient to scale to realistic problems. We present a Java-based framework that uses pipelining and circuit-level optimizations to build efficient and scalable privacy-preserving applications. Although the standard garbled circuit protocol assumes a very week, honest-but-curious adversary, techniques are available for convert-ing such protocols to re...
We propose a new two-party computation protocol using Yao’s garbled circuits, which is secure in the...
Abstract. This paper reports on a number of conceptual and technical contributions to the currently ...
Secure two-party computation cannot be fair in general against malicious adversaries, unless a trust...
We consider secure two-party computation in a multiple-execution setting, where two parties wish to ...
Protocols for secure two-party computation enable a pair of mistrusting parties to compute a joint f...
Abstract. We study efficiency tradeoffs for secure two-party computation in presence of malicious be...
Abstract. We optimize the communication (and, indirectly, compu-tation) complexity of two-party secu...
Abstract. We consider secure two-party computation in a multiple-execution setting, where two partie...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
In the setting of secure two-party computation, two parties wish to securely compute a joint functio...
We propose a new two-party computation protocol using Yao’s garbled circuits, which is secure in the...
We propose a new two-party computation protocol using Yao’s garbled circuits, which is secure in the...
Abstract. This paper reports on a number of conceptual and technical contributions to the currently ...
Secure two-party computation cannot be fair in general against malicious adversaries, unless a trust...
We consider secure two-party computation in a multiple-execution setting, where two parties wish to ...
Protocols for secure two-party computation enable a pair of mistrusting parties to compute a joint f...
Abstract. We study efficiency tradeoffs for secure two-party computation in presence of malicious be...
Abstract. We optimize the communication (and, indirectly, compu-tation) complexity of two-party secu...
Abstract. We consider secure two-party computation in a multiple-execution setting, where two partie...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
the 1980s, Yao presented a very efficient constant-round secure two-party computation protocol withs...
In the setting of secure two-party computation, two parties wish to securely compute a joint functio...
We propose a new two-party computation protocol using Yao’s garbled circuits, which is secure in the...
We propose a new two-party computation protocol using Yao’s garbled circuits, which is secure in the...
Abstract. This paper reports on a number of conceptual and technical contributions to the currently ...
Secure two-party computation cannot be fair in general against malicious adversaries, unless a trust...