1 Institutions of Public Information and the Problem of Regulatory Commitment

Can regulatory commitment be credible under de-facto non-independent regulation? When state and regulators collude, civil society actors can generate information and try to change voter strategy. Such public interest groups can thus aim at inducing party competition for a change in the regulatory set-up. In this paper we show using a game theoretical linked action situation approach that in the short run public information produced by public interest groups actually tends to reduce commitment, irrespective of a change in the set-up. This leads to what we call a ‘low commitment trap’. We provide some indicative support to this claim through one instance of public monitoring of electricity in India. Yet, as we show, in the long-run this dilemma can be solved under a repeated game situation where state regulators make only public interest moves ‘knowing ’ that a perennial commitment trap would otherwise be created. However, this is possible only when the institutional environment for information production is strong. We conclude that ‘institutions of public information ’- not independence – is the necessary condition for commitment