The visible hand: ensuring optimal investment in electric power generation, mimeo

This article formally analyzes the causes of underinvestment in electric power generation, and the various corrective market designs that have been proposed and implemented. It yields four main analytical \u85ndings. First, using a simple numerical example, (a linear demand function, calibrated on the French power load duration curve), strategic supply reduction is shown to be a more important cause of underinvestment than the imposition of a price cap. Second, physical capacity certi\u85cates markets implemented in the United States restore optimal investment, but increase producers pro\u85ts beyond the imperfect competition level. Third, \u85 nancial reliability options, proposed in many markets, fail to restore investment incentives. If a "no short sale" condition is added, they are equivalent to physical capacity certi\u85cates. Finally, if competition is perfect, energy only markets yield a negligible underinvestment compared to the optimum. Taken together, these \u85ndings suggest that, to ensure generation adequacy, policy makers should put more e¤ort on enforcing competitive behavior in the energy markets, and less on designing additional markets