Add to ORKGWe study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discount-ing. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payo¤s as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players \u85xed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are su ¢ cient for the folk theorem
International audienceWe prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less...
We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto...
We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of the two rooms. ...
We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated gam...
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in...
ABSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount fac...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public mon-itoring asserts that for a ...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is les...
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs i...
We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games ...
The 'folk theorem ' formalizes the theme that 'repetition leads to cooperation'....
Ce document est également paru dans la série des Cahiers de la Chaire "Les particuliers face aux ris...
We provide simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a tight, recursive upper bound on the s...
We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experi...
International audienceWe prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less...
We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto...
We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of the two rooms. ...
We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated gam...
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in...
ABSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount fac...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public mon-itoring asserts that for a ...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is les...
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs i...
We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games ...
The 'folk theorem ' formalizes the theme that 'repetition leads to cooperation'....
Ce document est également paru dans la série des Cahiers de la Chaire "Les particuliers face aux ris...
We provide simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a tight, recursive upper bound on the s...
We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experi...
International audienceWe prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less...
We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto...