Abstract. As the bargaining power of the transnational corporations (TNCs) in the sample increased relative to the bargaining power of the host country, and as the desire of the TNCs for a high level of equity ownership increased, the percent equity ownership of the TNCs in their subsidiaries increased. The relationship between percent equity ownership and subsid-iary success from the TNCs ' viewpoint, however, was J-shaped. High and low levels of equity ownership were associated with high levels of success. Control of critical operational variables by the TNC was directly related to success. * Over the past 20 years there has been continuing controversy over the determinants and effects of different patterns of ownership and control o...
This draft: July 2000We examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders by the contro...
Multinational enterprises (MNE’s) and their subsidiaries operate in a vast number of countries, and ...
Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control ...
200 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998.International equity joint ve...
Abstract. lWo approaches may explain how multinational enter-prises (MNEs) select ownership structur...
In each decade since 1960, transnational corporations (TNCs) have tripled their foreign direct inves...
Cross-border acquisitions by firms from emerging economies have risen sharply in the present millenn...
This paper explores a striking empirical pattern that has gone unnoticed in the literature: U.S. mul...
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of international joint venture activities in Taiwan. The...
In recent years, corporate governance scholarship has begun to focus on the most common distribution...
This study focuses on the bargaining relationship between partner firms in joint ventures between Un...
In this paper we examine whether state and foreign ownership affect the shape of the value-net worki...
Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control ...
What is an appropriate equity sharing arrangement for international joint ventures is an important b...
49 p.This paper offers an explanation for the divergent corporate governance outcomes observed in Si...
This draft: July 2000We examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders by the contro...
Multinational enterprises (MNE’s) and their subsidiaries operate in a vast number of countries, and ...
Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control ...
200 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998.International equity joint ve...
Abstract. lWo approaches may explain how multinational enter-prises (MNEs) select ownership structur...
In each decade since 1960, transnational corporations (TNCs) have tripled their foreign direct inves...
Cross-border acquisitions by firms from emerging economies have risen sharply in the present millenn...
This paper explores a striking empirical pattern that has gone unnoticed in the literature: U.S. mul...
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of international joint venture activities in Taiwan. The...
In recent years, corporate governance scholarship has begun to focus on the most common distribution...
This study focuses on the bargaining relationship between partner firms in joint ventures between Un...
In this paper we examine whether state and foreign ownership affect the shape of the value-net worki...
Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control ...
What is an appropriate equity sharing arrangement for international joint ventures is an important b...
49 p.This paper offers an explanation for the divergent corporate governance outcomes observed in Si...
This draft: July 2000We examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders by the contro...
Multinational enterprises (MNE’s) and their subsidiaries operate in a vast number of countries, and ...
Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control ...