Supplementary Appendix to Rich Communication, Social Preferences, and Coordinated Resistance against Divide-and- Conquer: A Laboratory Investigation (2013)

In the text, before proceeding to our experimental design, we first discuss how rich communication may affect the behavior of victims and beneficiaries. As background for this discussion, we informally sketch in the text a model developed in Cason and Mui (2013) that was designed to study how incomplete information about social preferences and non-binding restrictive communication (in the form of a binary message) affect behavior in the repeated CR game. We then informally explain how the model can be used to demonstrate that the presence of heterogeneous social preferences transforms the subgame following a DAC transgression (the DAC subgame) into a game of incomplete information. We also state that it can be shown that an informative equilibrium exists in the CR game with social preferences and non-binding restrictive communication, in which restrictive communication can help coordinate resistance between the victim and the (SP-type) beneficiary. This appendix sketches the model that we discussed informally in the text. Detailed discussion of the model and proofs of results are reported in the Technical Appendix of Cason and Mui (2013) that is available a