We show that under some conditions it is optimal for the non-innovating south to give patent protection for a longer period than the innovating north. However, a cooperative patent agreement involves a larger protection by each country compared to the non-cooperative situation
One of the subjects under discussion at the Uruguay Round for the last 4 years has been the introduc...
Using a North-South trade model with innovation and imitation, we investigate the interaction of int...
We examine how trade liberalization affects South’s incentive to protect intellectual property right...
Under certain conditions it is optimal for the noninnovating south to give patent protection for a l...
In a stylized model involving two agents a developing country (called South) and a foreign patent-ho...
In a North-South trade model, we analyse the implications of southern patent protection on southern ...
We consider the differential incentives of the North and the South to provide patent protection to i...
Much of the dynamic literature on intellectual property protection (IPP) arrays goods along a segmen...
We build a theoretical North-South model to analyze intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. B...
Northern…rms with patented technology can export goods to Southern markets and incur tari ¤ costs or...
Northern firms with patented technology can export goods to Southern markets and incur tariff costs ...
In the context of international technology transfer from the developed North to the developing South...
This paper constructs a North–South quality-ladder model in which foreign direct investment (FDI) is...
The issue of optimal patent protection is of great importance since the inclusion of the trade relat...
In this paper, the authors discuss the possibility that the North and South may have differing techn...
One of the subjects under discussion at the Uruguay Round for the last 4 years has been the introduc...
Using a North-South trade model with innovation and imitation, we investigate the interaction of int...
We examine how trade liberalization affects South’s incentive to protect intellectual property right...
Under certain conditions it is optimal for the noninnovating south to give patent protection for a l...
In a stylized model involving two agents a developing country (called South) and a foreign patent-ho...
In a North-South trade model, we analyse the implications of southern patent protection on southern ...
We consider the differential incentives of the North and the South to provide patent protection to i...
Much of the dynamic literature on intellectual property protection (IPP) arrays goods along a segmen...
We build a theoretical North-South model to analyze intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. B...
Northern…rms with patented technology can export goods to Southern markets and incur tari ¤ costs or...
Northern firms with patented technology can export goods to Southern markets and incur tariff costs ...
In the context of international technology transfer from the developed North to the developing South...
This paper constructs a North–South quality-ladder model in which foreign direct investment (FDI) is...
The issue of optimal patent protection is of great importance since the inclusion of the trade relat...
In this paper, the authors discuss the possibility that the North and South may have differing techn...
One of the subjects under discussion at the Uruguay Round for the last 4 years has been the introduc...
Using a North-South trade model with innovation and imitation, we investigate the interaction of int...
We examine how trade liberalization affects South’s incentive to protect intellectual property right...