Position Taking and Position Avoidance in the U.S. Senate

Why do some legislators take fewer positions on roll-call votes than others? Do these omissions occur by chance, or is it possible that certain legislators avoid taking positions intentionally? This study analyzes whether differential electoral considerations affect the level of position taking among legis-lators. In particular, it examines whether electoral considerations may actually lead some legislators to avoid taking positions on roll-call votes in an effort to conceal their issue preferences from con-stituents. Based on U.S. Senate data from the years 1979 to 1996, the results suggest that unwilling-ness to take positions on roll-call votes is not random. Instead, it is significantly related to factors such as diversity of constituents ’ opinions, pursuit of higher office, electoral marginality, retirement decisions, and visibility within the institution. For a representative democracy to function effectively, constituents must have a basis for judging whether their representative shares their preferences on public policy issues and, thus, whether to return that member to office at election time. In practice, however, legislators sometimes remain silent regarding their position on votes before their chamber, not participating in a vote and not announcing any position. Why do some legislators take fewer positions on roll-call votes than others? Do these omissions occur by chance, or is it possible that certain legis-lators avoid taking positions intentionally? The literature suggests that the reelec-tion incentive drives members of Congress to “position take ” in order to identify themselves with their constituents (Mayhew 1974).1 Yet it may also be the case that electoral considerations actually lead some members to refuse to take posi-tions on issues in a deliberate effort to conceal this information from voters