We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyn-cratic play is intentional instead of random. In contract games, the stochastically stable state se-lected by intentional idiosyncratic play is the Nash bargain, rather than the usual Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliograp...
We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjus...
Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori, Mailath and R...
We introduce intentional idiosyncratic play in a standard stochastic evolutionary model of equi-libr...
The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strate...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...
The Thesis applies evolutionary game theoretic ideas to the modelling of economic behaviour. The tra...
Equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game is investigated in a learning context with persistent ...
This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random bes...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occ...
This paper studies the dynamic and equilibrium-selecting behavior of a multi-agent system consisting...
We consider an economy where a finite set of agents can trade on one of two asset markets. Due to en...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliograp...
We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjus...
Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori, Mailath and R...
We introduce intentional idiosyncratic play in a standard stochastic evolutionary model of equi-libr...
The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strate...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...
The Thesis applies evolutionary game theoretic ideas to the modelling of economic behaviour. The tra...
Equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game is investigated in a learning context with persistent ...
This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random bes...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occ...
This paper studies the dynamic and equilibrium-selecting behavior of a multi-agent system consisting...
We consider an economy where a finite set of agents can trade on one of two asset markets. Due to en...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.Includes bibliograp...
We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjus...
Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori, Mailath and R...
DOI
Add to ORKG