Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics† By DANIEL KAHNEMAN* The work cited by the Nobel committee was

during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we explored the psychology of intu-itive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded rationality. Herbert A. Simon (1955, 1979) had proposed much earlier that decision makers should be viewed as boundedly rational, and had offered a model in which utility maxi-mization was replaced by satis cing. Our re-search attempted to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent models. The rational-agent model was our starting point and the main source of our null hypotheses, but Tversky and I viewed our research primarily as a contribution to psychology, with a possible contribution to economics as a secondary ben-e t. We were drawn into the interdisciplinary conversation by economists who hoped that psychology could be a useful source of assump-tions for economic theorizing, and indirectly a source of hypotheses for economic research (Richard H. Thaler, 1980, 1991, 1992). These hopes have been realized to some extent, giving rise to an active program of research by behav