State Policy Priorities and Their Effect on House Voting Behavior

A key question in the congressional literature addresses the motivations of members of Congress. What is the key determinant of their behavior while in office? Early work focused on members ’ desire for reelection (Mayhew 1974; Downs 1957). Downs (1957) assumed that members (and their parties) were motivated solely by their desire to win elections; therefore if voters chose based upon the candidate or party closest to them on policy, the candidates would converge to the median in order to maximize their chances of winning. Mayhew (1974) built upon this assumption arguing that election/reelection was not the only motivation shaping member behavior, but that it fit reality well despite its simplicity, and placed an emphasis on individual members rather than political parties, which he considered to play a minimal role in legislative behavior. Fenno (1973) argued that some members were also driven by their desire for power and for good public policy. According to Fenno, members were constrained by a more elaborate constituency than was implied by Downs. He theorized that in addition to geographic and reelection constituencies, members also had primary constituencies and personal constituencies. The primary constituency is composed of a member’s strongest supporters, implying that