Western Capital versus the Russian State: Towards an Explanation of Recent Trends in Russia’s Corporate Governance

The literature on corporate governance in Russia stresses the abuse of shareholder rights in the face of various asset-diversion tactics by the management. Attributing this fiasco to a number of structural obstacles and the privatization legacy, the orthodox account fails to incorporate–let alone explain–the recent data demonstrating a qualitative improve-ment of corporate governance in crucial segments of the Russian economy. This paper disaggregates “corporate govern-ance ” into specific institutions and examines their quality at the firm level as well as by sector. The data supporting the analysis is drawn from recent studies by the OECD, UBS Warburg, CEFIR, and other organizations. The causal inference presented in this paper critically evaluates the impact of foreign capital on the improved corporate governance in Russia’s blue-chip firms. The paper presents two alternative state-centered scenarios to explain the implementation of interna-tionally accepted standards of corporate governance by Russia’s big business.